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Convergent thinkingThe distinction between convergent and divergent cognitive processes given by Guilford (1956) had a strong
inﬂuence on the empirical research on creative thinking. Neuroscientiﬁc studies typically ﬁnd higher event-
related synchronization in the EEG alpha rhythm for individuals engaged in creative ideation tasks compared
to intelligence-related tasks. This study examined, whether these neurophysiological effects can also be
found when both cognitive processing modes (convergent vs. divergent) are assessed by means of the
same task employing a simple variation of instruction. A sample of 55 participants performed the alternate
uses task as well as a more basic word association task while EEG was recorded. On a trial-by-trial basis, par-
ticipants were either instructed to ﬁnd a most common solution (convergent condition) or a most uncom-
mon solution (divergent condition). The answers given in the divergent condition were in both tasks
signiﬁcantly more original than those in the convergent condition. Moreover, divergent processing was
found to involve higher task-related EEG alpha power than convergent processing in both the alternate
uses task and the word association task. EEG alpha synchronization can hence explicitly be associated with
divergent cognitive processing rather than with general task characteristics of creative ideation tasks. Further
results point to a differential involvement of frontal and parietal cortical areas by individuals of lower versus
higher trait creativity.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
It seems to be a matter of the time we live in that creativity is be-
coming more and more important, not only in its classic ﬁeld like the
arts but also in scientiﬁc, technological and economic contexts as well
as in everyday life. As Dietrich and Kanso (2010) put it: “All progress
and innovation depend on our ability to change existing thinking pat-
terns, break with the present, and build something new“ (p. 822).
Therefore, academic psychology has become increasingly interested
not only in the study of human intelligence but also creativity as a
central variable in human achievement. The psychological line of re-
search since the 1950s has also been able to demystify creativity to
a certain degree. While earlier perspectives considered creativity as
something dark and mysterious, it can nowadays be regarded as a
common cognitive process with relevance to many areas of everyday
life (Simonton, 2000).
In his well-known Structure-of-Intellect model, Guilford (1956) dis-
tinguished convergent from divergent cognitive processes. While con-
vergent processes are involved in straightforward problem solving,niversity of Graz, Maiffredygasse
316 380 9811.
),
ubauer@uni-graz.at
-ND license.divergent thinking is the “kind that goes off in different directions“
(Guilford, 1959a, p. 381). The unique feature of divergent thinking
tests thereby is “that a variety of responses is produced” (Guilford,
1959b, p. 473). This view, which could possibly be called a two-
process-model, has also been emphasized by other authors such as
Kris (1952). Out of a psychoanalytical point of view, he described crea-
tivity as the ability to switch between primary and secondary process
cognition; i.e. more autonomous and associative versus logical and
reality-oriented thinking. Primary processes should be more likely to
occur in states of dream or reverie (as well as in the pathological state
of psychosis), whereas secondary processes are dominant in waking
consciousness. These processes are regarded as two poles of one contin-
uum, on which creative people should be better able to move between
them than less creative ones. There is a good line of evidence supporting
these hypotheses. It could be shown that creative people report more
fantasy activity, remember their dreams better, are more easily hypno-
tized and show, as predicted by Kris, better ability to shift between pri-
mary and secondary processes (for an overview see Martindale, 1999).
Mendelsohn (1976) conceived creativity as a result of individual
differences in the focus of attention and attentional capacity. Defo-
cused as opposed to focused attention corresponds to a higher atten-
tional span, and hence allows for more possibilities to combine
different concepts and generate novel ideas. Summing up, there
exist different models involving two opposing cognitive processes, ei-
ther called divergent/convergent, primary/secondary or defocused/
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or less identical but expressed in very different vocabularies“ (p. 139).
Generally, creativity is associated with the former rather than the latter
process, although there is an agreement that complex creative problem
solving often involves both processes (Cropley, 2006).
A number of neurophysiological investigations have addressed
the research question whether divergent as opposed to convergent
thinking processes are related to dissociable patterns of cortical
activation. To this end, many studies contrasted the brain activation
during the performance of creative ideation tasks as compared to
intelligence-related tasks. In an early study, Martindale and Hasenfus
(1978) found higher EEG alpha power during a phase of creative
inspiration but not during a presumably more convergent phase of
creative elaboration. The interpretation of alpha power as an inverse
function of cortical arousal led to a broader theory suggesting that
creative cognition is more likely to happen in a state of low cortical
arousal (i.e. high alpha power) commonly referred to as the “low-
arousal-hypothesis” (Martindale, 1999). More recent neuroscientiﬁc
studies of creative thinking could not only corroborate but also
extend these ﬁndings leading to a better understanding of alpha
activity in creative cognition: Fink et al. (2007, 2009a) demonstrated
higher increases in alpha power (from a prestimulus reference
period to an activation period; subsequently referred to as alpha
synchronization) during the performance of the alternate uses task
(i.e., a standard creative ideation task which requires participants
to think of original uses for common everyday objects) as compared
to more verbal intelligence-related tasks like the completion of word
sufﬁxes or the generation of object characteristics. In another study,
Fink et al. (2009b) found higher alpha synchronization during the
imagination of a dance improvisation than during imagination of
performing a standard waltz dance. These ﬁndings suggest that the
more creativity-related a task is, the higher is the synchronization
of alpha activity. Mölle et al. (1999) reported higher dimensional
complexity of the EEG alpha and beta spectrum for creative ideation
tasks (e.g., alternate uses task) as opposed to intelligence-related
tasks (e.g., mental arithmetic task). A further study investigating
dimensional complexity showed that the solving of ill-deﬁned prob-
lems was accompanied by higher coherence as it was the case in
well-deﬁned problems (Jausovec and Jausovec, 2000).
On an interindividual level, Martindale and Hines (1975) found that
individuals scoring high on an alternate uses task showed higher alpha
power in frontal cortical areas as opposed to less creative persons. In a
more recent study, persons who gave more original answers in an al-
ternate uses task were found to show higher alpha power increases
in frontal and also posterior brain regions of the right hemisphere
(Fink et al., 2009a). This ﬁnding stands in line with a hypothesis
put forward by Jung-Beeman (2005) suggesting that focused left-
hemispheric semantic processing is accompanied by a contralateral,
right-hemispheric, process inducing a broader spreading activation
in the semantic network. Jausovec (2000) found that functional cou-
pling in frontal and parietal brain regions was higher in creative than
in gifted individuals during divergent thinking underpinning the
notion of two distinct mental abilities.
Although there is a considerable body of evidence for the phe-
nomenon of alpha synchronization during creative idea generation,
other studies using different methodologies provided different results:
Razumnikova (2000) found that a divergent thinking task as well as
an arithmetic task induced desynchronization in the lower and upper
alpha bands compared to a resting condition in a sample of young
males. A study involving the remote associates task and a simple asso-
ciates task demonstrated decreases in lower and upper alpha power es-
pecially over posterior cortex sites in both sexes (Razumnikova, 2007).
The cognitive neuroscience of creativity is still struggling with a
high grade of heterogeneity concerning its methods of investigation
(Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). According to Dietrich
and Kanso's review, it is hard to draw any convincing conclusionsout of the data: “The most forthright conclusion that can be taken
away from the present review is that not a single currently circulating
notion on the possible neural mechanisms underlying creative think-
ing survives close scrutiny” (p. 845). Arden et al. state that this might
be the case because it is hard to compare studies to one another due
to substantially different research paradigms involving different crea-
tivity tasks and again different control tasks. In order to study the
nature of divergent thinking, it hence appears more accurate to con-
trast divergent and convergent thinking processes within the same
type of task instead of comparing two entirely different tasks (e.g.
an alternate uses vs. an arithmetic task). In this study convergent
and divergent thinking was operationalized by means of two different
response conditions either asking for the generation of original or of
common responses to the same task. This procedure allows examin-
ing whether alpha synchronization, as commonly observed during
divergent thinking tasks, can unambiguously be attributed to the pro-
cess of divergent thinking and not to other general task characteristics
inherent in this speciﬁc type of task. In order to study the robustness
and generalizability of this phenomenon we employed two different
ideation tasks, the alternate uses task as well as a word association
task. While the alternate uses task can be conceived as a standard
task of creative ideation, the word association task reﬂects basic
ideational processes that were found to underlie creative thinking
(Benedek et al., 2012 ; Mednick, 1962; Merten and Fischer, 1999). We
hypothesize that divergent task processing in both ideation tasks
should be accompanied by stronger synchronization of alpha
power as compared to convergent task processing, especially in
frontal cortical areas. Furthermore,we expect that the pattern of neuro-
physiological activity stands in interaction with individual differences
in trait creativity.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were sampled from a larger pool of 929 pupils, which
had previously been screened for creativity and intelligence (see next
section). They were selected to differ with respect to creativity but not
with respect to intelligence. The sample consisted of N=55 young
males (28 high creative individuals) with an age ranging from 15 to
18 years (M=16.79, SD=0.68). All participants were healthy, right-
handed and gave written informed consent prior to the EEG session.
They were paid for participation.
2.2. Psychometric tests
Creativity screenings were based on the averages of the scales
Anwendungs-Möglichkeiten [Alternate Uses], Insight-Test and Zeichen-
Fortsetzen [Continue Figures] of the Berliner Intelligenzstrukturtest
(BIS; Jäger et al., 1997). These were scored quantitatively reﬂecting
a measure of ideational ﬂuency. Intelligence was assessed by
means of the Intelligenzstrukturanalyse (ISA; Institut für Test- und
Begabungsfoschung and Gittler, 1998). Personality structure was
assessed with the German version of the Eysenck Personality Ques-
tionnaire (EPQ-R; Ruch, 1998). The EPQ-R was administered in
order to explore possible personality correlates of task performance.
State anxiety was assessed as part of a standard procedure in order
to rule out the possibility of excessive state anxiety related to the
EEG test setting. using a German version of Spielberger's Stait-
Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (STAI; Laux et al., 1981).
2.3. Experimental tasks and conditions
Two different verbal tasks were employed to assess creative idea-
tion at two different levels of task complexity. The alternate uses (AU)
task is a well-established creative ideation task, which requires
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A word association (AS) taskwhich requires participants to name an as-
sociation to a given concept was employed as a second more basic
ideation task. Both tasks had to be performed under two experimen-
tal conditions, requiring participants either to ﬁnd a highly common
solution (common response condition) or to ﬁnd a highly uncommon
solution (uncommon response condition).
For example, in the AU task participants might be shown the stim-
ulus word brick and would then respond e.g. to build a wall in the
common or to use for karate demonstration in the uncommon re-
sponse condition. In the AS task, participants were instructed to pro-
duce either a common or an uncommon association to a stimulus.
Given for instance the word mother as a stimulus, participants could
respond father in the common or earth in the uncommon condition.
Each task featured 10 items per condition. The order of item pre-
sentation was randomized within each task; the experimental condi-
tions were counterbalanced for each item in order to ensure equal
numbers of responses in either condition. Items for the AU task
were adapted from a pool of items used in previous studies (cf. Fink
et al., 2009a, 2010), those for the AS task were taken from the
word-association lists constructed by Merten and colleagues
(Merten, 1990; Merten and Fischer, 1999), and from the German
word-association norms by Riedlnger (1994).
Three female and three male students rated originality of re-
sponses (similar to the consensual assessment technique proposed
by Amabile, 1982) given in both the AU and the AS task on a four-
point scale ranging from 1 “very common” to 4 “very uncommon”.
All ratings displayed high internal consistencies (Cronbach's α>.85).2.4. Apparatus/EEG recording
The EEG was measured by means of Ag/AgCl electrodes. 33 elec-
trodes were placed according to the enhanced 10–20-system. A
ground electrode was placed on the forehead, a reference electrode
on the tip of the nose. To measure eye movements, an electrooculo-
gram (EOG) was recorded bipolarly between two diagonally placed
electrodes above and below the inner and the outer canthus of the
right eye. EEG impedances were kept below 5 kΩ; EOG below
10 kΩ. All signals were sampled at a frequency of 512 Hz. During re-
cording a bandpass (0.1–100 Hz) as well as a 50 Hz notch-ﬁlter in
order to avoid power line contaminations were applied (all apparatus
distributed by BrainProducts GmbH, Gliching/GER).
The experimental paradigm was the same in the AU and the AS
task and comprised four phases within each trial. As depicted in
Fig. 1, each trial started with the presentation of a ﬁxation cross dur-
ing the reference phase. Subsequently, a cue indicated the mode of
requested cognitive processing in the preparation phase: When an n
was presented, participants were to think of a common (normal) so-
lution for the item to be presented next; a u indicated they should
ﬁnd an uncommon solution. (These stimuli were selected becauseFig. 1. Schematic time course of the experimental tasks. After a reference period of 5 s,
participants were instructed either to ﬁnd a normal (n) or an uncommon (u) solution
to the subsequent task (preparation period of 5 s). Next, a stimulus word was pre-
sented (in this example brick) until participants pushed a button in order to indicate
an idea (idea generation period of max. 15 s in the association task, and 30 s in the
alternate uses task). After giving an oral response, a second button press initiated the
next trial.of their exactly corresponding physical features after spatial rotation
by 180 degrees; they nevertheless can clearly indicate a different
meaning.) In the idea generation phase, participants were shown the
actual stimulus word (for instance brick). During this time, no response
was required and participants were instructed not to speak. As soon as
they wanted to name their idea, participants pushed a response button.
A speech balloon indicated the onset of the response phase inwhich par-
ticipants could vocalize their response. Termination of response was
indicated by another push of the response button. After an inter-trial-
interval of 1000 ms the next trial started. For each trial, the time-out
was set to 30 s for AU task, 15 s for AS task.2.5. Quantiﬁcation of cortical activity
The raw EEG was corrected for ocular artifacts by means of a
regression-based algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983) using the software
Brain Vision Analyzer (1.05; BrainProducts Gmbh, Gliching/GER).
Remaining artifactswere removed by visual inspection. Further analysis
steps were performed by means of a set of Matlab scripts (R2011b;
The MathWorks, Inc.). The bandpower of the EEG (μV2) was computed
by means of a time–frequency analysis employing a Fast Fourier-
transformation (FFT) with a window size of 1000 ms and an overlap
of 900 ms. From this, the power in the lower (7.5–10.5 Hz) and upper
(10.5–12.5 Hz) alpha frequency bandwas extracted. Changes in cortical
activation were quantiﬁed by means of task-related power (TRP)
changes between reference and activation phases for each electrode
and trial (Pfurtscheller, 1999; see also Gerloff et al., 1998). The TRP
method was used since it yields robust scores and the variance of
spectral power measures can further be stabilized by logarithmic (log)
transformation (Halliday et al., 1995). Task-related power at an
electrode i was obtained by subtracting the log-transformed power
during prestimulus reference intervals (Powi, reference) from the log-
transformed power during the idea generation intervals which
served as activation phases (Powi, activation) according to the formula:
TRP(i)=log(Powi, activation)− log(Powi, reference). Negative values
therefore reﬂect decreases in power from reference to activation
(subsequently referred to as desynchronization), positive values re-
ﬂect increases (referred to as synchronization; cf. Pfurtscheller and
Lopes de Silva, 1999). In both tasks and conditions, the whole time
period of idea generation (from 500 ms after stimulus onset to
500 ms before the pushing of the idea button) served as activation
interval. Trials with timeouts were excluded from the analyses; at
least 500 ms of artifact-free samples were needed in every phase of
a trial in order to be counted as valid. Participants were excluded if
less than 50% of valid trials were available in either of the experimen-
tal conditions.
Electrode positions were aggregated to the following areas:
Anteriofrontal (AF) left (FP1, AF3), frontal (F) left (F3, F7), frontocentral
(FC) left (FC1, FC5), centrotemporal (CT) left (C3, T3), centroparietal
(CP) left (CP1, CP5), parietotemporal (PT) left (P3, T5), parietooccipital
(PO) left (PO3, PO5, O1); analogously for the right hemisphere (even
numbers).2.6. Procedure
Prior to the EEG session, participants ﬁlled in the EPQ-R and the
STAI. The EEG session started with the recording of two resting condi-
tions with eyes open and eyes closed for 2 minutes each. Subsequently,
participants performed theAS task followed by theAU task. The instruc-
tions were presented separately for each task in a standardizedmanner
using an interactive computer presentation featuring two exercise trials.
The STAI was administered once more between the two tasks. The
whole EEG session took about 1 hour. The procedure was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the University of Graz.
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3.1. Behavioral results
Dealing ﬁrst with the AU task, a two-way ANOVA for repeated
measures was conducted using the within-subject factor CONDITION
(common vs. uncommon) and the between-subject factor GROUP
(low vs. high creative). A signiﬁcant main effect CONDITION indicated
that ideas produced in the uncommon response condition were
rated higher on originality (M=2.51 [SE=0.39]) than those given
in the common condition (M=1.13 [SE=0.33]; F [1,53]=938.00,
pb .001, η2partial=.95). A signiﬁcant main effect GROUP yielded
evidence that highly creative individuals produced more original
ideas (M=1.88 [SE=0.40]) than their lower creative counterparts
(M=1.76 [SE=0.40]; F [1,53]=4.36, pb .001, η2partial=.08). The inter-
action between CONDITION*GROUP remained insigniﬁcant (F [1,53]=
1.76, ns).
In the AS task, a signiﬁcant main effect CONDITION indicated that
association responses given in the uncommon condition were rated
signiﬁcantly higher on originality (M=2.26 [SE=0.47]) than those
given in the common condition (M=1.26 [SE=0.14]; F (1,53)=
242.77, pb .001, η2partial= .82). The factor group and the interaction
between both remained insigniﬁcant (GROUP: F [1,53]=0.38, ns,
η2partial= .01; CONDITION*GROUP: F [1,53]=0.06, ns). The signiﬁ-
cant CONDITION effects in both tasks hereby provide evidence for
the validity of the experimental manipulation.
In both, the AU and the AS task, reaction times were signiﬁcantly
higher in the uncommon than in the common response condition
(AU: Common M=5.19 [SE=0.37], Uncommon M=10.30 [SE=
0.45]; F (1,53)=209.28, pb .001, η2partial=.80; AS: Common M=4.15
[SE=0.22], Uncommon M=7.17 [SE=0.31]; F (1,53)=145.10,
pb .001, η2partial=.74). There were no further signiﬁcant effects related
to the experimental groups.
Originality of uncommon responses in the AU task was negatively
correlated to the lie-scale (L) of the EPQ-R (r=−.29, pb .05) in the
way that persons tending to fake response behavior gave less original
answers. In the AS task, originality of uncommon responses was cor-
related to psychoticism ([P] r=.34, pb .05) showing that individuals
who scored higher on P produced more original associations. Further-
more, higher creative individuals were more extraverted than their
lower creative counterparts (Low: M=15.22 [SE=7.33], High:
M=18.64 [SE=4.00]; t39.29=2.14, pb .05). Concerning state anxiety,
no differences between the experimental groups or the time of mea-
surement were found.
3.2. EEG results
EEG data were analyzed by means of two separate ANOVAs for
each task considering the within-subject factors CONDITION (com-
mon vs. uncommon), HEMISPHERE (left vs. right) and AREA (from
AF to PO) and the between-subject factor GROUP (low vs. high crea-
tive). A multivariate analysis approach was used which is known to
be robust in face of violations of sphericity (Vasey and Thayer,
1987). The alpha level was set to 5%.
Since EEG power in the upper and lower alpha bands turned out
to be highly correlated in both tasks and experimental conditions
(.50b rb .70), the subbands were aggregated to a single alpha band
ranging from 7.5 to 12.5 Hz (for correlational evidence see Fink et al.,
2005).
In the AU task, a main effect AREA (F [6,43]=25.02, pb .001,
η2partial= .78) showed a monotonic decrease in TRP from anteriofron-
tal regions to posterior regions. A main effect HEMISPHERE (F [1,48]=
14.49, pb .001, η2partial= .24) showed generally stronger decreases
in alpha power in the left hemisphere. The interaction between
AREA*HEMISPHERE (F [6,43]=7.14, pb .001, η2partial= .50) indicat-
ed a stronger alpha desynchronization in the left hemisphere ascompared to the right hemisphere at the electrode sites from CT to
PO (Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests, pb .01).
In line with our hypothesis, a signiﬁcant main effect was observed
for the factor CONDITION (F [1,48]=36.01, pb .001, η2partial=.43),
reﬂecting that the production of uncommon uses was generally
accompanied by lower decreases of alpha power than the produc-
tion of common uses. The interaction between CONDITION*AREA
(F [6,43]=5.15, pb .001, η2partial=.42) indicated that this effect dif-
fers over cortical areas: While the condition effect is generally evident
at all electrode sites, no power differences between electrodes were
observed over anteriofrontal to centroparietal areas during uncom-
mon response generation whereas power signiﬁcantly declined
from anterior to posterior regions in the common condition (Tukey's
HSD post-hoc tests, pb .05; see Fig. 2). The between-subjects factor
GROUP remained insigniﬁcant (F [1,48]=1.25, ns).
In the AS task, a signiﬁcant main effect AREA (F [6,43]=23.92,
pb .001, η2partial= .77) was observed, reﬂecting a pattern of de-
crease in alpha power from anterior to posterior regions as it was
found in the AU task. A signiﬁcant main effect HEMISPHERE
showed generally stronger decreases in alpha power in the left
hemisphere (F [1,48]=10.53, pb .01, η2partial=.18). Again, an interac-
tion between AREA*HEMISPHERE (F [6,43]=5.81, pb .001, η2partial=.45
revealed that the left hemisphere exhibited stronger decreases in
alpha power as compared to the right hemisphere from centrotem-
poral to parietooccipital areas (Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests, pb .05).
More interestingly, a signiﬁcant main effect CONDITION (F [1,48]=
25.60, pb .001, η2partial=.35) revealed again lower desynchronization
of alpha power during the production of uncommon as opposed to
common ideas. This difference is signiﬁcant across all cortical areas.
Similar to the AU task, no power differences were observed over
anteriofrontal to centrotemporal regions in the uncommon response
conditionwhereas signiﬁcant power declines from anterior to posterior
regions were evident in the common condition (CONDITION*AREA:
F [6,43]=3.49, pb .01, η2partial=.33; Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests,
pb .05). This effect was further moderated by the factors HEMISPHERE
and GROUP (CONDITION*AREA*HEMISPHERE: F [6,43]=3.15, pb .05,
η2partial=.30; CONDITION*AREA*HEMISPHERE*GROUP: F [6,43]=
2.86, pb .05, η2partial=.28) suggesting a differential effect of lower
and higher creative individuals: In higher creative individuals, the
condition effect (lower alpha desynchronization during generation
of uncommon responses) is evident throughout all electrode sites
in both hemispheres including anteriofrontal and frontal brain re-
gions (Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests, pb .05). Lower creative individ-
uals, however, display no signiﬁcant differences in anteriofrontal
and frontal alpha power, but show a condition effect only in frontocen-
tral to parietooccipital regions (pb .01). The production of uncommon
responses is hereby accompanied by lower desynchronization in cen-
trotemporal to parietooccipital areas in the right as compared to the
left hemisphere (pb .05; see Fig. 3). The main effect GROUP remained
insigniﬁcant (F [1,48]=1.25, ns).
Interestingly, a tendential interaction between the factors
CONDITION*AREA*HEMISPHERE*GROUP was also found in the AU
task (F [6,43]=2.24, p=.06, η2partial=.24). Tukey's HSD test revealed
signiﬁcant condition effects (pb .01) across all electrode sites in both
hemispheres, except for AF in the lower creative group. Higher creative
individuals showed the strongest increases in alpha power in frontal
areas. Lower creative persons, instead, showed the strongest increases
during uncommon idea generation in posterior regions of the right
hemisphere (pb .01; see Fig. 2).
4. Discussion
A central novelty of this study was to examine the brain activation
related to convergent and divergent thinking processes using the
same task by means of an experimental variation of the instruction.
Hence, stimulusmaterial did in noway differ between the experimental
Fig. 2. Task-related power (TRP) changes during generation of common vs. uncommon responses in the alternate uses task. Positive TRP indicates task-related alpha synchroniza-
tion (blue), negative values indicate desynchronization (red). Vertical bars indicate±1 standard error (SE) of the mean.
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ity can be fully attributed to the variation of the instruction. This exper-
imental variation was highly effective, as the uncommon response
instruction resulted in much more uncommon responses than the
common response instruction. This was true for both, the alternate
uses task and the word association task. It can, therefore, be assumed
that this variation of instruction results in a subtle but effective var-
iation of elicited processing modes, triggering either convergent
thinking processes (common response condition) or divergent
thinking processes (uncommon response condition). Regarding the
originality of responses given, originality of uncommon uses was
negatively correlated to the lie-scale (L) of the EPQ-R whereas orig-
inality of uncommon associations was related to psychoticism (P).
These results provide further support for the validity of the used
tasks in terms of Eysenck's notion that: “P combines originality
with lack of socialisation, while L combines socialisation with lack
of originality” (Eysenck 1995, p. 237).
The experimental variation did not only result in differences of
response behavior but also induced different patterns of neurophysi-
ological activation. It was found that the production of uncommon
responses was in both tasks generally accompanied by lower decreases
of task-related alpha power than the production of common responses.
While in the basic association task, generally weaker desynchronization
(TRP around zero) of alpha power was observed during uncommonFig. 3. Task-related power (TRP) changes during generation of common vs. uncommon resp
(blue), negative values indicate desynchronization (red). Vertical bars indicate±1 standardthan common response generation, this result was even more pro-
nounced in the alternate uses task. Here, thinking about uncommon
responses yielded synchronization of alpha power in frontal and
parietal cortical regions, whereas the generation of common responses
induced desynchronization. These results can be seen as supporting our
hypothesis and stand in line with a number of studies demonstrating
the signiﬁcance of alpha activity in creative cognition (Fink and
Neubauer, 2006; Fink et al., 2007, 2009a). We hence can conclude that
increased levels of alpha power (i.e., higher task-related alpha synchro-
nization or reduced task-related desynchronization) are speciﬁcally
related to the process of divergent thinking rather than other processes
elicited by other general task characteristics of creative ideation tasks.
According to current theories on the functional interpretation of
EEG alpha synchronization, it is either viewed as a correlate of active
top-down inhibition of task-irrelevant processes (Klimesch et al.,
2007; Sauseng et al., 2005) or of internally directed attention
(Cooper et al., 2003; Jensen et al., 2002). Recent evidence suggests
that increased internal processing demands (in convergent and
divergent thinking) result in frontal alpha synchronization, whereas
parietal synchronization is supposed to facilitate the recombination of
semantic information in divergent thinking (Benedek et al., 2011).
Divergent thinking as assessed in the present study (i.e., ﬁnding un-
common solutions) may thus more strongly draw on internal pro-
cessing than convergent thinking (i.e., ﬁnding common solutions),onses in the association task. Positive TRP indicates task-related alpha synchronization
error (SE) of the mean.
224 E. Jauk et al. / International Journal of Psychophysiology 84 (2012) 219–225since common solutions have stronger association strengths and can
be retrieved more easily (Mednick, 1962). Moreover, the stronger
alpha power increases observed in the alternate uses task (as com-
pared to the association task) point to an increase in internal proces-
sing demands along with task complexity. The higher response times
in the AU than in the AS task suggest that a higher depth of internal
ideational elaboration took place in the former task. At this, it should
be noted that other studies which revealed strong alpha synchroni-
zation during creative thought used performance intervals of up to
3 minutes (e.g., Fink et al., 2009b). The rather low total response
times in the word association task of 4 to 7 s thus may explain why
in this task no task-related synchronization of alpha activity was
evident, but uncommon responses just resulted in lower task-
related desynchronization of alpha activity as compared to uncom-
mon responses.
A recently published fMRI-study using essentially the same re-
search paradigm as we did (although stimuli were presented as visual
objects) investigated cortical activity during “creative” as opposed to
“common” object use in a between-subject comparison (Chrysikou
and Thompson-Schill, 2011). The main result was that creative object
use was accompanied by activity in posterior regions of the brain
whereas common object use elicited prefrontal activity. The authors
interpret the missing prefrontal involvement during creative object
use as a state of diffuse attention due to hypofrontality. Considered
together with EEG studies that found frontal alpha synchronization
in creative ideation tasks, this interpretation rather conforms to the
cortical idling-hypotheses (Pfurtscheller et al., 1996). However, the
view that EEG alpha during cognitive tasks reﬂects pure cortical idling
has, as discussed above, been mainly superseded and other studies
using fMRI point to the active role of prefrontal areas in creative
ideation (Fink et al., 2009a, 2010).
The observed four-factorial interactions in the word association
task and the alternate uses task suggest a speciﬁc pattern of neural
activity with respect to interindividual differences: While lower crea-
tive persons showed little variance between convergent and diver-
gent processing in the activation of their frontal cortices, highly
creative individuals displayed more variability in frontal areas. This
effect seems more pronounced in the right than in the left hemi-
sphere and is characteristic for both tasks. It could therefore be
hypothesized that highly creative individuals are possibly better able
to adaptively switch between different modes of cognitive processing
and accordingly show increased frontal ﬂexibility. This interpretation
would go along with different theories of creativity, such as Kris'
(1952) ability to shift between primary and secondary process cogni-
tion, or Martindale's (1999) conception of differential attention. The
notion that highly creative individuals display greater variability in
frontal cortical activation would also correspond to a neurophysiologi-
cal framework of creativity proposed by Dietrich (2004), who assumes
that frontal cortical areas of the right hemisphere are involved in pro-
cesses of attentional ﬂexibility. A recent empirical investigation involv-
ing a Stroop-paradigm also suggests that highly creative persons show
greater ﬂexibility in cognitive control on a behavioral level (Zabelina
and Robinson, 2010).
For lower creative individuals, a robust difference between
convergent and divergent cognitive processing was observed in pos-
terior rather than in frontal brain regions: It turned out that during
the generation of uncommon responses, lower creative persons
exhibited alpha synchronization (or weak desynchronization) in cen-
trotemporal to parietooccipital regions, while production of common
responses resulted in substantial alpha desynchronization. This inter-
individual difference in responsivity could lead to the interpretation
that lower and higher creative persons may employ different strategies
in the production of uncommon responses: While highly creative in-
dividuals show strong involvement of prefrontal structures which
has been related to internally focused attention, lower creative
individuals may pursue less a top-down strategy rather involvingparietal regions that have been associated with loose semantic memory
processing (Jung-Beeman, 2005).
A possible limitation of the present study could be seen in the dif-
ference of reaction times between both response conditions (with
uncommon responses taking approximately twice as long as common
responses in both tasks). It is, however, quite obvious that the pro-
duction of uncommon responses usually takes more time than the
production of common responses. The employed experimental
tasks, which did not enforce constant response times, hence can be
considered to allow for a high grade of ecological validity. Neverthe-
less, the effect of response times was analyzed in additional analyses.
These analyses revealed that the strong and highly signiﬁcant main
condition effects persisted when activation periods of equal duration
were selected for computation of task-related power changes. A fur-
ther possible limitation of this study may be the restricted generaliz-
ability of results. While in the present study only males were tested in
order to avoid an oversized factorial design, future research should
address the question to which extent sex might be a moderating var-
iable in neurophysiological creativity research (cf. Fink and Neubauer,
2006).
This study extends the present research insofar as the phenome-
non of alpha synchronization was found to be unambiguously associ-
ated with the actual mode of cognitive processing (divergent vs.
convergent thinking) rather than with other task characteristics pos-
sibly varying between different tasks (e.g., alternate uses vs. mental
arithmetic). Furthermore, the present study corroborates the notion
of alpha power changes as a robust correlate of divergent thinking
which generalizes over tasks: It was found that the classic alternate
uses task induced similar patterns of cortical activation as did the
more basic word association task. Differences between convergent
and divergent processing were hereby more pronounced in the alter-
nate uses task. This may lead to the interpretation that alpha power
changes reﬂect ideation processes, which are not task-speciﬁc, but
that the extent of these effects may still depend upon the depth of ide-
ational elaboration. Furthermore, it is suggested that lower and higher
creative individuals make use of different strategies in divergent think-
ing: While highly creative persons show stronger frontal ﬂexibility,
lower creative individuals involve rather parietal regions in the genera-
tion of uncommon responses.
Although it is becoming apparent that some consistency can be
achieved in neurophysiological creativity research, the complex nature
of frontal cortex functioning in divergent and also convergent thinking
makes it eligible to gain more knowledge of the involved neuroana-
tomical structures in different task demands. Studies combining the
high temporal resolution of the EEG with the spatial accuracy of the
fMRI would be of particular interest in this question and could more-
over provide a better understanding of the functional meaning of
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